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Abstract: This paper reviews the economic and historical literature on debt
mutualization in Europe with reference to pre-1914 guaranteed bonds and the
current Eurobonds debate. We argue that, notwithstanding the differences in
scale and nature, debt mutualization solutions similar to Eurobonds were tried
before, and the closest historical examples to the present debate are the pre-1914
guaranteed bonds. We highlight three key characteristics of debt mutualization,
which are apparent both in the current debate and in history: moral hazard, debt
dilution and conditionality. We show that the fears about short-run dilution
and moral hazard were not unknown to pre-1914 market participants. These
problems were partly addressed by mechanisms of conditionality such as inter-
national financial control. The historical evidence suggests that the dilution of
outstanding obligations may be overplayed in the current debate. On the con-
trary, creditors’ moral hazard (ignored in current debt mutualization proposals)
was as problematic as the usual debtor’s moral hazard –especially when the
groups of countries guaranteeing the bonds and the creditor nations did not
overlap entirely.
Keywords: debtmutualization, debt dilution,moral hazard, conditionality, pre-1914
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1 Introduction
The recent debate on the European sovereign debt crisis has attracted different
proposals in policy fora. These involve mostly unpopular solutions ranging from
structural reforms, stronger federalism, and quantitative easing to debt mutua-
lization. Having appeared under different labels and guises and commonly
known as Eurobonds, the debt mutualization proposals, in essence, recommend
the governments of the EU countries to pool all or a certain portion of their debts
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together. This would presumably reduce borrowing costs for sovereigns and
induce much needed stability to the European sovereign debt market. Although
the proposals found some support, they also attracted strong criticisms for their
potential negative impacts, particularly the risks of moral hazard and the dilution
of current outstanding debt.
Compared to other tried solutions for fiscal crises, such as debt restructuring
or default, inflation and devaluation, possibly combined with liquidity assis-
tance and stabilization plans from multilaterals, there is precious little evidence
on the potential effectiveness of the Eurobonds proposal. The bailout and
recapitalization programs organized since 2010 offer some suggestions of how
Eurobonds could fare in the market, particularly after the reduction in mid-2011
of the interest paid by program countries to close to the effective cost of funding
the associated multilateral loans raised by the European institutions and the
IMF. However, it is questionable whether the relatively short experience with
these loans is a good estimate of the consequences of debt mutualization for the
future of European financial stability. The debate has therefore been mainly
informed by untested hypotheses about the behavior of financial markets and
sovereigns after the issue of Eurobonds (Claessens et al., 2012).
This paper aims to review the relevant economic and historical literature on
debt mutualization by drawing on the history of guaranteed bonds before 1914.
We highlight parallels between current and historical debates around the ques-
tions of debt dilution, moral hazard and conditionality, and provide an overview
of the economic and historical studies. We place at the center of our review five
bonds, which were issued during the nineteenth century with the guaranty of
other sovereigns, usually a combination of the great powers of the time (Britain,
France, Germany and Russia). Unlike the current European program bonds
(EFSM, EFSM and ESM), these issues were perceived by the market as instances
of debt mutualization, which allows for a direct comparison with the current
proposals for the issue of Eurobonds. Perhaps because of the risks involved,
these loans were raised very sparsely and often only after overcoming consider-
able political opposition within the guarantor countries themselves. Somewhat
ironically, these operations started with a Greek loan in 1832, which can argu-
ably be considered the first Eurobond in history. After the first Greek loan, there
were four other guaranteed loans issued before 1914 – for Turkey (Ottoman
Empire) in 1855, Egypt in 1885, China in 1895, and Greece again in 1898.
Elsewhere, we use the long historical record of these loans to address three
main questions – how the introduction of guaranteed bonds impacted existing
creditors, how they were initially received by the markets, and how markets
priced guaranteed debt relative to the other financial liabilities of the nations
involved (Esteves and Tuncer, 2016).
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Part of our review also compares the guaranteed bonds with their historical
relatives in the pre-1914 period, namely, sub-sovereign borrowing (colonial
bonds) and bonds issued under international financial control. Our presenta-
tion, therefore, places the pre-1914 guaranteed bonds in the broader historical
context of the governance of the sovereign debt market.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes and compares
the current proposals for the issuance of Eurobonds with reference to the debate
on debt dilution and moral hazard. Section 3 provides the corresponding debate
in the nineteenth century, emphasizing the similarities and differences between
the two periods. Section 4 provides historical detail on the five guaranteed
bonds to highlight the individual context for each bond issue. A brief conclusion
follows.
2 Moral hazard and debt dilution in Eurobonds
Although the idea of increased coordination of public debt in Europe had been
floated around the introduction of the Euro, it did not get much mileage at the
time. The report of the Giovannini Group (2000) was mostly skeptical about the
purported benefits. The proposal re-emerged in the very different context of the
Euro crisis. Whereas the Giovannini group had concentrated on the long-term or
steady-state costs and benefits of mutualization, the new debate focused more
on stabilizing the European market for sovereign debt and the financial system
(Brunnermeier et al., 2011; Angeloni and Wolff, 2012).
Since September 2008 a half-dozen alternative plans to implement some
version of Eurobonds emerged in the literature from academics, trade associa-
tions and official organizations. All aim to fulfill a combination of four objec-
tives: manage the current crisis, reinforce financial stability and facilitate the
transmission of monetary policy in the Euro area, improve market efficiency,
and enhance the international role of the Euro. Despite the commonality of
objectives the various plans diverge on several levels, especially on the ques-
tions of coverage and guaranties.
The majority of plans recommend that Eurobonds cover only partially the
funding requirements of member countries to discourage fiscally weaker states
from using these bonds to overborrow. The exceptions are Dübel (2011), Beck
et al. (2011) and Brunnermeier et al. (2011), who propose to swap the entirety of
existing debt into two tranches of joint bonds.1 A related question is whether
1 However, only the first or senior tranche (ESBies) would be virtually safe from default,
whereas the second tranche of junior bonds (EJBs) would take any losses first.
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Eurobonds should be issued only in the primary market or also to swap for
existing debt. In the first case, only the marginal cost of funding would be
affected for participating countries, whereas in the second the average cost
would also fall if yields on Eurobonds were lower, as expected. The most salient
proposals for the partial issue of Eurobonds are the “blue/red bonds” of Delpla
and von Weizsäcker (2010) and the “safe bonds” of Bofinger et al. (2011). The
two have diametrically opposed approaches. Blue bonds, jointly issued, would
be capped at a fraction of GDP (possibly 60% as in the Maastricht criteria),
whereas any excess debt would remain the responsibility of individual countries
that continued to issue their own “red” bonds. Bofinger et al. (2011) propose to
mutualize only the excess debt above 60% of GDP, though in the context of a
redemption plan to extinguish it over the medium-term.
The second main distinction between proposals has to do with the legal
nature of the guaranty of common bonds. If the guaranty is only several, each
guarantor state is expected to take the responsibility for only a share of the loan
in case of default, whereas with a joint guaranty participant countries are
individually liable for the full amount. Some proposals require joint responsi-
bility for common bonds, despite its likely violation of the no-bailout clause of
the European treaties (Delpla and von Wiezsäcker, 2010; Jones, 2010; Barclays
Capital, 2011; Favero and Missale, 2011). Precisely because of this, other authors
consider that several guaranties would be enough (De Grauwe and Moesen,
2009; Brunnermeier et al., 2011). Some authors also provision for further guar-
anties in the form of seniority clauses over pre-existing debt, or credit enhance-
ments, such as shock-absorbing collateral (cash or gold reserves) – particularly
with a view to ensure that the new Eurobonds would be rated AAA by credit
ratings agencies.
Given the breadth of these proposals it is not surprising that the expected
impacts of their undertaking also varies considerably, namely when compared
with the four objectives listed at the beginning of this section. The most obvious
beneficiaries are the “weak countries” currently facing a widening of spreads.2
Either through pooling, diversification, seniority or credit enhancements, the
new Eurobonds are expected to pay lower yields than most national debts,
thereby allowing countries a cheaper access to funds. This is especially impor-
tant during financial crises, when markets can no longer price risk efficiently
and may spread financial trouble through contagion, a problem to which the
Delors (1989) report already alerted.
2 Nevertheless, all proposals exclude the program countries undergoing bailout arrangements
with the “troika” (ECB, EC, and IMF), at least until these programs are completed.
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“Strong countries”with normal access to wholesale markets would also benefit
indirectly, and perhaps even directly, from the creation of Eurobonds. The main
indirect benefits are financial stability and greater efficiency in monetary policy
transmission within the Eurozone, once the home bias in banking portfolios of
sovereign debt is replaced with the issue of a safe(r) asset on which the whole
financial system can base itself. More pointedly, Jones (2010), Brunnermeier et al.
(2011) and Varoufakis and Holland (2011) consider that Eurobonds would be an
efficient way of recycling surpluses within the Eurozone without destabilizing
current accounts, and of allowing countries such as Germany to continue pursuing
their export-led growth. Direct benefits would come in theway of greater liquidity of
the joint bonds, as well as a greater international role for the Euro.3 Interestingly,
although mentioned by all proposals, the estimates of liquidity gains are very
limited, ranging from 30 to 70 basis points in the more optimistic assessments to
close to nothing in the more conservative estimates of the European Commission’s
(2011) Green Paper and Favero and Missale (2011).4
This raises the question of how to motivate the participation of stronger
countries in the Eurobonds issuance, as the liquidity gains might not compen-
sate for the increase in funding costs from pooling risk with weaker nations.
Several proposals address this issue by including explicit mechanisms to redis-
tribute a share of the gains to the stronger nations, such that all participants
benefit from the system (De Grauwe and Moesen, 2009; Boonstra, 2010;
NATIXIS, 2011). Although theoretically and algebraically conceivable, these
redistribution rules raise practical implementation questions. Two of the most
important are the time consistency of the rules and whether they are consistent
with fiscal stabilization in the Eurozone.
Moreover, there is also considerable skepticism in the literature about the
net advantages of the Eurobonds proposals, not to mention about the political
feasibility of the idea currently in Europe. Starting with tranching and seniority,
several studies point out that a Modigliani-Miller effect may apply with negative
consequences for nations’ ability to roll over their stocks of “red debt.” By virtue
of the issue of Eurobonds nothing is changed in the underlying fiscal position of
individual countries, consequently if a tranche of “blue,” “safe,” or “synthetic”
bonds is carved out of their debt stocks with seniority and enhanced guaranties,
3 The two are related in the sense that some authors consider that the role of the Euro as
reserve currency is hampered by the fragmented issue of sovereign bonds in the Eurozone that
does not allow for the creation of a benchmark asset comparable to the US T bonds.
4 However, the latter estimates may be contaminated by the fact that the German Bunds and
the bonds of other AAA Euro-members have already benefited from a “safe haven” status since
2009.
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the remaining debt stock will have to bear the brunt of greater illiquidity and
risk premia (Kopf, 2011; Brunnermeier et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2012). The
obvious way of avoiding this would be to swap the full stock of “legacy debt”
with Eurobonds, but that raises equally obvious concerns about moral hazard.
However, the maintenance of stocks of national debt is seen as a way of
distinguishing between liquidity and risk premia, since the latter would con-
tinue to be priced by the markets in the remaining “red bonds”. An intermediate
solution requires a careful calibration of the relative size of multilateral and
national bonds. The share of “blue bonds” has to be large enough to improve
fiscal sustainability ratios, but small enough to allow countries to maintain
market access at affordable interest rates (Gros, 2010).
Moral hazard concerns loom large among the criticisms of Eurobonds,
particularly since the recent experience of the SGP implies that even ex-ante
firm rules are time inconsistent in the context of a financial crisis, and all the
more because of the high level of cross-border financial integration in the EU
(see Issing, 2009; Gros, 2011; Favero and Missale, 2011, among many). Kopf
refers to this as “an illusion of seniority that cannot be enforced in times of
crisis. In the end, member countries that wish to remain current on their own
obligations may end up having to pay for Portuguese, Greek or Irish sovereign
debt.”5 This incentive problem might completely negate the expected liquidity
gains of a common Eurobond benchmark issue. In a survey conducted in
2008, primary market dealers and credit rating agencies were uniformly
averse to joint guaranties of Eurobonds, as well as to insurance mechanisms
that pool risk between strong and weak nations (EPDA, 2008). These mechan-
isms were seen a new incarnation of the structured products behind the
financial crisis of 2008. But Eurobonds with several guaranties are not
immune from problems either, as credit rating agencies such as Standard &
Poor’s have warned that their rating may not be above (as desired), or even at
the level of the average ratings of the participating nations, but in fact below,
and possibly as lower as the lowest individual rating. This issue derives from
the convexity of risk premia, which may rise more than proportionally with
underlying risk factors. In other words, the average risk premium of a portfo-
lio of bonds may be higher than the premium charged to an individual country
with the same average risk.
As a solution to the moral hazard problem, a number of authors propose
“conditional Eurobonds.” The range of conditionality varies significantly from
5 Kopf (2011:9).
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structural reform programs, which impose fiscal discipline, to making the
Eurobonds accessible to only a group of AAA-rated countries. (Erber, 2012;
Boonstra et al., 2013; Hild et al., 2014). In a recent study modeling the impact
of conditionality on the form of structural reform programs, Beetsma and
Mavromatis (2014) highlight that making the guaranty conditional on sufficient
reforms may create positive incentives for both “core” and “periphery” govern-
ments and increase the welfare of the “union.” Alternatively, the yields effec-
tively paid by participating countries could be adjusted relative to the cost of
funding of the Eurobonds-issuing agency so as to incentivize fiscal consolidation
(Bonstra, 2010; Dübel, 2011; Muellbauer, 2011, 2013; European Commission,
2011). Countries pursuing “bad fiscal policies” would face an increasing sche-
dule of funding costs, whilst others would be compensated for their fiscal
efforts. This would also help preventing the build-up of unsustainable debt
problems, similar to what happened after the introduction of the Euro when
markets were not able to screen sovereign risk adequately. In the next section,
we turn our attention to the historical debate on debt mutualization and revisit
the issues of moral hazard, debt dilution and conditionality in the context of pre-
1914 guaranteed bonds.
3 Debt mutualization and guaranteed bonds
before 1914
Although the discussion over Eurobonds has taken place with very limited
historical reference, the sovereign debt market before 1914 had several striking
parallels to the proposals listed above. The emergence of an international bond
market and the boom in foreign securities during the 1820s marked an important
milestone in the evolution of sovereign bond contracts to reduce the risk of
default. This was also the case after the sovereign debt crises of the 1870s, which
led to new ways of dealing with defaults (Wynne, 1951; Suter, 1992; Neal, 1998;
Neal and Davis, 2006; Flandreau and Flores, 2009; Tuncer, 2015).
One common way of ensuring repayment of government bonds was to link
each issue to a form of security. These security clauses served the interest of
creditors, as they safeguarded the interest and capital payments of a loan in the
absence of a multilateral enforcement mechanism. Similarly, borrower govern-
ments had positive incentives to provide such securities given that they could
be an important determinant of the cost of credit. From the 1820s to 1914 there
was considerable variation in the methods for securing sovereign bonds. One
approach was to use the real estate of sovereigns as a way of guaranteeing
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the payment. The major legal problem with this type of security was the
confusion between private and public sphere in terms of liability in the case
of a default.6 A similar but more widespread tool was to use tangible assets and
commodities such as precious metals or raw materials (Borchard, 1951). Another
category still was to assign part of or the entire state revenues of the debtor as a
pledge. These revenues could be from any source. State monopolies, customs
and railway revenues, or even tithes could be used to secure new loans. For
instance, the Greek independence loans of 1824 and 1825 were both secured by
“all revenues and the whole national property of Greece.”7 Although assigning
government revenues looked like an attractive solution to increase the cred-
ibility of a sovereign, it could also reduce its future borrowing capacity espe-
cially if the entire state revenues had already been pledged for the service of
previous loans. Moreover, this issue of debt dilution could lead to legal pro-
blems in the case of a default or debt readjustment as the seniority between
bonds was not clearly assigned.
Sovereign immunity also raised questions about enforcement given that
creditors often did not have direct control over the specific assets or revenues
pledged. In the second half of the nineteenth century these enforcement pro-
blems led bondholders to create permanent organizations to overcome collective
action problems when negotiating with a defaulting sovereign. The best known
of these organizations was the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
(Mauro et al., 2006; Esteves, 2013). After some defaults, creditors were able to
gain access to the revenues assigned for the service of the debt. In certain cases,
this access involved the direct collection of the assigned revenues, while in
others the revenue collection could be handled by autonomous or private
organizations, which functioned independently from both governments and
creditors. In either case, the arrangement meant a partial loss of fiscal sover-
eignty. Although international financial control organizations had a positive
impact on the credibility of debtor countries and increased their borrowing
capacity, their success relied on the cooperation of debtor governments, thus
they did not guarantee any future repayments for creditors. Comparative studies
of international financial control suggest that their capacity to collect assigned
revenues for the purposes of debt repayment depended critically on local poli-
tical conditions and on the type of revenues in question.8
6 See Hoyle (1986) and Cannon (1972) for a discussion of the case of Egypt, where the Khedive
pledged his personal estates to contract the loans of 1870 and 1877.
7 Wynne (1951:285).
8 On this see Deville (1912), Hyde (1922), Andreades (1925), Wynne (1951) and Tuncer (2015).
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In certain cases, borrower governments could agree with their foreign cred-
itors to use some of the revenues under foreign control to secure future loans
(Tuncer, 2015). It is important to note that these bond issues differed from the
model of guaranteed bonds, even if two of the guaranteed bond issues on which
we elaborate (Egypt in 1885 and Greece in 1898) were issued in the presence of
international financial control suggesting that foreign creditors not only took
control of local finances but provided additional support through guaranteed
loans. A separate consideration has to do with the fact that there was not always
a perfect overlap between the list of guarantors and the Powers with a say in
financial control. For instance, the Greek 1898 bond was guaranteed by France,
Britain and Russia and floated simultaneously with the imposition of external
control, where not only the guaranteeing powers were represented but also
Austria, Germany, and Italy.
All these different forms of securing debt had varying degrees of interference
with the sovereignty of debtor states. At the extreme end of this spectrum stood
sub-sovereign borrowing or the bonds issued under a formal or informal colonial
status. Two of the countries, which issued guaranteed bonds (China and Egypt)
were under a status of informal colonial dependency from outside powers.
Nevertheless, the guaranteed bonds of these countries were perceived differently
in the market from other colonial issues, in that they were not priced entirely on
the fiat of the colonial power. Colonial issues were more than guaranteed by the
colonizer, as the latter reserved complete control over colonial finances.
Moreover, in case of a default, the bankruptcy process would be managed
from the center. These differences suggest that contemporary investors treated
pricing and default probabilities of colonial borrowing in a separate category
from sovereign borrowing (Accominotti et al., 2010, 2011). In a recent working
paper, Chavaz and Flandreau (2015) elaborate further on the pricing of colonial
bonds and show that these bonds were priced not on their default risk but on
their liquidity.9 As far as our debate on Eurobonds is concerned, all these
differences suggest that colonial bonds were not instances of debt mutualization
similar to Eurobonds, where participants retain their political and fiscal sover-
eignty. Hence, in this broader context of governing sovereign debt through
different securing mechanisms, the guaranteed bonds studied here, which
directly relied on the credit of other states acting as guarantors, are the closest
analogues to the current proposals for debt mutualization in the Eurozone.
9 It is possible that the spreads on colonial bonds would potentially differ on the specific
contractual clauses regulating repayment conditions in case of a default, but we are not aware
of research on this issue.
Eurobonds Past and Present 667
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/3/17 4:37 PM
Before we provide a more detailed historical overview of each guaranteed
bond issue, we should highlight the similarities and differences between guar-
anteed bonds and Eurobonds. First, the issue of guaranteed bonds was usually
determined by political considerations of the guarantor states themselves–
mostly one or a combination of the great powers of the time, i. e. Britain,
France, and Russia. In fact, all guaranteed bonds issued between the 1832 and
1914 were linked to some sort of political turmoil (Viner, 1928; Jeze, 1924). The
guaranteed bond, issued in support of Greek independence from the Ottoman
Empire in 1833 was the first example of the involvement of the great powers into
such an arrangement. The Greco-Turkish war of 1897 was also the cause for the
1898 Greek loan, similarly to the Crimean War for the 1855 Ottoman loan, and
the Sino-Japanese war for the 1895 Chinese loan. Even in the case of the
Egyptian loan of 1885, the main cause of the financial need of the country was
the payment of war expenditures and associated indemnities from the Urabi
revolt. The motivation for the issue of Eurobonds today is obviously different
and aims mostly at financial stability. Nonetheless, political and financial sta-
bility were closely associated in the nineteenth century, especially in the Eastern
Mediterranean and China where the interests of the great powers often clashed.
Leading investment banks of the time co-operated to prevent political conflict in
Europe from destabilizing the capital markets (Polanyi, 1944; Flandreau and
Flores, 2011). The real motives behind guaranteed bonds were obvious to con-
temporary observers. In response to the claims that the Egyptian guaranteed
loan was issued on financial grounds, the Economist had the following to say:
The idea that the Powers have been influenced by purely financial motives in pressing
their services upon Egypt is really too absurd to be entertained. They have all of them quite
enough to do to manage their own monetary affairs, and they are not so foolishly generous
as to insist upon burdening themselves with fresh financial obligations, except in the hope
and expectation of gaining some advantage thereby. And the advantage they expect to
gain is sufficiently obvious. They are acting on the sound principle that financial respon-
sibility involves financial control, and the control of the finances of necessity implies
control of the Government.10
Despite this acknowledgement of Realpolitik, guaranteeing a loan was not
always a straightforward decision from the perspective of the guarantor states.
For instance, while the French chamber quickly approved the guaranty of the
1855 Ottoman Loan, the consent of the British parliament hanged by a thread.
The House of Commons raised serious objections to the loan given the poor
10 “The Proposed Egyptian Settlement,” The Economist (London, England), Saturday, 21 March
1885; p. 343; Issue 2169.
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credit of the Ottoman Empire at the time and the negative memory of the Greek
guaranteed loan of 1833.11 After lengthy discussions, the guaranty was passed by
a majority of only three, despite the fact that France and Britain were at the time
in an alliance with the Ottomans to fight Russia in the Crimean war.
In a recent article, Steinbach (2015) emphasizes a similar point about the
debt settlement in the US following the adoption of the US constitution in 1790
and ensuing debt mutualization between the states. Not unlike the guaranteed
bonds issued by European powers, he emphasizes the role of domestic stake-
holders in opposing debt mutualization. Whereas the opponents usually under-
lined the potential moral hazard problems, proponents saw debt as a “public
burden” and argued that debt mutualization was crucial given economic inter-
dependencies and spillovers, hence sharing the debt would be beneficial for all
states. The existence of opposition to the arrangement led to protracted bargain-
ing between the parties, especially around the idea of imposing “conditionality”
to avoid moral hazard problems.
In this regard, we have already observed that guaranteed loans sometimes
infringed on the debtors’ sovereignty via some form of conditionality, particu-
larly given their political nature. However, this interference was not intrinsic to
guaranteed loans, and it could vary from none or very weak interference to
foreign financial control, depending on the broader political context. For
instance, the guaranty for the 1855 Ottoman Loan required that the proceedings
of the loan were entirely used for war purposes and a special commission
consisting of British and French representatives was formed to supervise this
condition (Kiray, 1988; Al, 2007). The 1898 Greek guaranteed loan was harsher
in this regard and coincided with the establishment of the international financial
control over certain revenues of the Greek state. In the case of the 1885 Egyptian
loan, however, the order of events was the other way around. This bond was
issued with the extra guaranty of Britain and France, which already held the
control of Egyptian finances since 1876 (Andreades, 1925; Tuncer, 2015).
The second distinctive feature of guaranteed loans was the intention of the
guarantor states to make the debt of the borrower his own. This was clearly the
case with the 1855 Turkish loan, the 1885 Egyptian loan, and the 1898 Greek loan,
which were grouped together with the British funds in the official list of the
London stock exchange. Therefore, guaranteed bonds were priced in the second-
ary market differently from other issues of the debtor, not only because of the
value of the guaranty itself, but also because of the externality that their issue
11 The Greek guaranteed loan of 1833 went into default in 1836. It was finally redeemed in 1871
after a significant reduction in the outstanding interest. See Levandis (1944:28), HCPP (1864)
No. 144 and HCPP (1864) No. 3346.
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imparted on previous bonds, either through explicit seniority clauses, specially
assigned revenues, or simple debt dilution effects. Interestingly, British colonial
bonds were not classed in the same category and the British government also only
resorted to explicit guaranties of colonial issues very sparingly.12
The third and final characteristic was the relationship between guaranteeing
powers, which also depended on their political motives. A first consideration
here was how the different credit standing of the guarantors reflected on the
yields of the guaranteed bonds. The worries about “convex scenarios” in yields
were already present in the nineteenth-century debates. The Economist used
precisely this argument in condemning the guaranty of the 1885 Egyptian loan
as disadvantageous to the UK: “It would be easy to show that the proposed
international guaranty is unfair to us, because, if left to ourselves, we could
raise the money at a lower rate than when our credit is impaired by being
mingled with that of a country like Russia.”13 Secondly, the extensive rivalry
between the powers could also make the conditions of the loan more favorable
for the borrower country. In 1895, following the defeat in the war with Japan,
China needed funds to meet the first installment of the war indemnity.14 In a
seeming extension of the great power rivalry in China to the realm of finance, a
competition ensued for the privilege of guaranteeing the projected loan. The
Economist of the time put it:
it is somewhat ludicrous to observe the struggle which is going on among European
financiers for the privilege of supplying China with the money she requires to pay the
indemnity demanded by Japan. Indeed, the Chinese government would be more than
mortal if it missed such a brilliant opportunity of getting all the assistance it requires.15
In the end a loan for 400 million francs was issued under formal Russian
guaranty. The conflict between guarantors was more serious in the case of the
Greek loan of 1833, namely because the guarantors went to war with each other
in 1853! The fact that this loan was issued under a several guaranty only created
the opportunity for moral hazard on the part of the creditors, rather than the
debtor, as usually assumed. As each guarantor was only responsible for a third
of the loan it had less of an incentive to lobby the Greek government to remain
12 To our knowledge, the only explicit guaranties of British sub-sovereign bonds covered one
Canadian bond, one Mauritius bond, several Irish land bonds and the 1885 Egyptian loan
studied here.
13 Issue of 21 March 1885, p. 344.
14 FO (1895) Miscellaneous Papers, Vol. 48, p. 160.
15 “The Coming Chinese Loan”, The Economist (London, England), Saturday, June 8, 1895;
p. 749; Issue 2702.
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current on its obligations to the other two powers. Worse than that, the powers
repeatedly supported the Greek government in selectively defaulting against
their opponents or used their share in the 1833 loan to court political favor in
Greece.16 Unsurprisingly, this set-up did not help with the governance of Greek
debt. Not only did Greece remain in default on its non-guaranteed bonds until
1879, but it also ended up paying back very little of the 1833 loan itself.17
Another source of moral hazard was the non-overlapping composition of
guarantors and countries participating in international financial control organi-
zations. The second Greek loan of 1898 is a good case in point. Germany, a
country with little financial interest in Greece at the time was nevertheless very
involved in the negotiation of the Greek debt workout. Despite not being one of
the guarantors of the 1898 loan, it acquired a seat in the International Financial
Commission, which controlled Greek finances from then on. In a sense, Germany
got something for nothing in this operation, as the financial guaranty of the
other Powers allowed Greece to pay the war indemnity to Turkey, a country in
which Germany was acquiring a large investment position. Consequently, it
lobbied for a harsher deal for Greece than what the guarantors – Britain,
France and Russia – were initially prepared to settle for (Levandis, 1944;
Wynne, 1951). Here too one is drawn to see parallels with the consequences of
the non-overlapping architecture of the EU and the Eurozone for the evolution of
the European debt crisis. Whilst financial stability in the Eurozone has positive
externalities for the rest of Europe and the World, financial responsibility has
mainly remained within the member countries.18
Turning to the scale of these operations, in 1833 Greece received guaranteed
bonds worth 57% of its previous loans. Greece again in 1898 was granted
guaranteed bonds corresponding to 19% of its outstanding debt. However, as
the guaranteeing powers imposed a 61% haircut over the preexisting debt, the
share of guaranteed bonds rose to close to half of the new debt stock (Esteves,
2013). These fractions were even higher in the cases of Turkey in 1855 and China
in 1895 and are comparable to the contemporary projects for the issue of
Eurobonds. Applying Delpla and von Weizsäcker’s (2010) proposal of issuing
blue bonds up to 60% of GDP would imply, in 2011, a stock of Eurobonds worth
35% of the pre-existing Greek debt, and more than 50% of the Irish or
Portuguese ones (see Figure 1).
16 Levandis (1944), Kofas (1981).
17 In 1864 Greece reached an agreement with the powers to reschedule the 1833 loan.
According to Wynne (1951), by then Britain had paid £1.2 million on charges of the loan and
had only received £100,000 from Greece.
18 With the exception of the bilateral British loan to Ireland in 2010.
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Where the historical cases depart mostly from the current Eurobond proposals is
on the scale of mutualization relative to the guarantors’ own debt stocks. The
same application of Delpla and von Weizsäcker’s proposal would involve a
mutualization of more than 4% of the Eurozone’s debt in the case of Greece
and slightly more than 2% each in the Irish and Portuguese cases. In contrast,
the scale of the historical operations was usually below 1% of the guarantors’
joint debt stocks. The exception was the Chinese loan of 1895, which represented
2.5% of contemporary Russian debt (see Figure 2).
Having said that, a first conclusion to take from the historical data is the
absence of “convex scenarios” in the issue of mutualized debt. Not only were
guaranteed bonds issued with an effective interest close to the average cost of
funding of the guarantors, but in two cases the rate was below the average
(Egypt in 1885 and Greece in 1898). The only possible support for the concern
that the credit of more reputable countries might be mixed with that of less
reputable ones is the first Greek loan of 1833. The effective interest rate of this
loan (5.3%) was 126 basis points above the average cost of funding of the three
guarantors. However, there are two alternative candidates to explain this
(see Figure 3). First is the fact that the loan only had a several guaranty. In
second place, this spread may also be driven by the refusal of the London
Stock Exchange (LSE) to list the new loan pending the settlement of the
previous independence loans, which were in default since 1826. As shown by
Flandreau (2013) the failure to list at the LSE involved a significant liquidity
penalty, which the author estimates in the order of 150 to 200 basis points.
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Figure 1: Share of blue (guaranteed) bonds in borrowers’ ex-post debt stock.
Sources: ECB and see text.
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Figure 3: Guarantors’ funding costs and yield of guaranteed bonds, 1832–1898.
Sources: Elaborated from Esteves and Tuncer (2016). Note: The average cost of funding is
established from the secondary yields of the following loans (when applicable): the 3% British
consols, the 3% French Rentes, the 4% Russian Nicholas Railway, the 4% Prussian consoli-
dated, the 4% Austrian Gold Rentes and the 5% Italian Rendita (4.6%).
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Figure 2: Share of blue (guaranteed) bonds in guarantors’ debt stock.
Sources: ECB, Almanach de Gotha (1834), Bonney (2010), Flandreau and Zumer (2004),
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As mentioned earlier, the closest contemporary comparators are the bonds
issued for the several bailouts and banking restructuring programs since 2010.
The combined value of the European share of these operations is worth c. 4%
of the total debt stock of the Eurozone today.19 Despite the great variation in
the credit standing of the nations guaranteeing these bonds, they were initially
well received by the markets and were priced at yields substantially lower than
the average of the guarantors and easily acquired AAA ratings. In the next
section, we provide further historical detail on each guaranteed bond issue
and highlight the historical context, particular conditions and evolution of
each case.
4 Guaranteed bonds before the Great War
4.1 The Greek 5% guaranteed loan of 1833
The modern state of Greece came into existence as a result of a lengthy war
against the Ottoman Empire between 1821 and 1832, and the Greek guaranteed
loan of 1833 was an outcome of this conflict. Prior to the issuance of this loan,
the Greek government had already contracted, with the support of the local
Philhellenic Society, two loans in London, known as the Independence loans of
1824 and 1825 and amounting to £2.8 million. Unsurprisingly, the newly founded
Greek state did not have enough resources to service the debt and very soon
suspended interest payments.20
In February 1830, Britain, France and Russia took the first steps towards the
independence of Greece in a conference held in London. In particular, the three
protecting powers agreed to guarantee a loan of 60 million francs for Greece,
which the new government wanted to raise for the purpose of maintaining a
military force essential to the safety of the country. This agreement was followed
by a convention drafted during the London Conference of April 1832 where the
three powers specifically stated the conditions under which financial assistance
was to be granted. These provisions were embodied in the treaty of May 1832,
according to which Russia, Britain and France granted a loan of 60 million
francs under the following conditions:
19 According to Eurostat data. We added the bilateral loans to Greece and the loans organized
under the EFSF, EFSM and ESM for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, while deducting the
IMF share of the latter. The outcome is €340 billion.
20 Kofas (1981), Wynne (1951).
674 R.P. Esteves and A.C. Tunçer
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/3/17 4:37 PM
1. The loan was to be raised by three installments of 20 million francs.
2. In each installment the three guaranteeing states were to become respon-
sible for the payment of one third of the annual amount of the interest and
sinking fund of the relevant installment.
3. Independently of the guaranty, the payment of the annual interest and
sinking fund was first secured upon the revenues of the Greek state.
4. The service of the new bond was to be senior to the independence loans of
1824 and 1825.
5. The diplomatic representatives of the three guaranteeing countries in Greece
would be specifically charged with supervising the fulfillment of these
conditions.21
After the official granting of the guaranty, a loan agreement was reached with
the house of Rothschild, and the contract was signed in Paris in May 1833. The
issue price was fixed at 94% with a 5% coupon. The effective interest rate was
therefore 5.3%, which was more than 100 basis points above the average cost of
funding of the guarantors, as measured by the secondary market prices of their
benchmark bonds at the time. Be it because of a “convex scenario” or the
liquidity costs of not listing at the LSE, this lesson was not lost on the con-
temporaries. In 1855, when the Turkish Loan Bill was being discussed in the
House of Commons, the Chancellor of the Exchequer remembered the 1833
arrangement as follows:
Those who managed this loan for the Greek Government, guaranteed by the credit of the
three Powers, contrived it so that, in the contract which threw all the credits together, that
joint credit was lower than the credit of any of the three guaranteeing Governments, and
the Greek Government lost the advantage of the comparatively high price of the English
and French funds. For myself, I can hardly conceive a financial arrangement more ruinous
to the State it proposes to assist, or less calculated to obtain the benefit of the guarantee
afforded by those Governments.22
Although the original agreement authorized only the first installment, as the
needs of Greece were urgent, the powers consented to the flotation of the second
series at the same time. More than one third of these funds was immediately
spent on the war indemnity to Turkey. In 1835 and then in 1836 the Greek
21 HCPP 1831–32 (007) Protocols of conferences held in London relative to the affairs of Greece.
22 HCH 1855 “Turkish Loan Bill”, Vol. 139, Commons Sitting of Friday, 27 July 1855, columns
1469–1470, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver = Z39.88-2004&res_dat = xri:
hcpp&rft_dat = xri:hcpp:hansard:CDS3V0139P0-0026.
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government pressed for the issue of the third installment, but due to disagree-
ment between the three powers, the advance of the remaining funds was
delayed. Eventually in 1836 the third issue was approved, but the proceedings
were devoted to the service of the two first installments.23
Due to continuous fiscal difficulties, in 1836 the Greek government deferred
the payment of the guaranteed loan until 1840, when the payments were
resumed, but only to be suspended again in May 1843. As a response, the
three guaranteeing states demanded that the Greek government scaled down
all public expenditure and assigned the custom proceeds of the port of Syra as a
guaranty for the future service of the loan. Greece eventually agreed to these
conditions in September 1843 but political turmoil delayed the ratification of this
agreement was delayed until 1845.
This situation did not change until the Crimean War, after which Britain,
France and Russia appointed their diplomatic representatives in Athens to act
as a financial commission to investigate Greek finances. The commission
reported in 1860 proposing extensive fiscal reforms targeting both government
spending and revenue. Moreover, the commission agreed that Greece could
allocate annually a minimum sum of 900,000 francs for servicing the guaran-
teed debt without hindering its public services. Although the Greek govern-
ment accepted this arrangement in June 1860, the payments did not follow.
Overall, the problem of the 1833 loan remained unsolved since the Commission
did not have any supervisory or administrative role over the finances of the
Greek government.24
In 1862, at last, the conditions changed due to dethronement of the Greek
king Otto, whose rule had been characterized by fiscal difficulties, lack of
financial and monetary reforms, and his “inability to dissolve the nation’s
foreign debt.”25 The second son of the King of Denmark, who was put forward
by Britain, eventually filled the vacancy. As a gesture to the new king, in 1864
the three powers agreed to abandon a total of £12,000 a year from the debt
charge. This sum was equal to one third of the prescribed minimum annuity of
900,000 francs. These funds were dedicated to the service of the 1833 guaran-
teed loan, and its amortization was finally completed in 1871. By that time the
indebtedness of Greece to the powers for their payments on account of interest
23 Wynne (1951: 284).
24 Levandis (1944:44–51).
25 Kofas (1981:132).
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and sinking fund amounted to about 92 million francs.26 Moreover, according to
the terms of 1864 agreement:
1. A new 5% bond to the value of £1,200,000 was to be issued for the
conversion of each £100 of 1824 and 1825 bonds at rates of 31.6% and
30.5%.
2. New bonds were also issued to exchange for 11.6% of the interest arrears.
3. Service of the new bonds amounting to £75,000 a year was to be secured by
the customs of Corfu and by a second charge on the stamp duty.
As for the independence loans an agreement was finally concluded in September
1878; by then the nominal amount of the debt, including accumulated arrears
had grown to about £10,000,000.27
The history of early Greek debt illustrates several of the topics in this paper. An
unsustainable debt burden relieved with external financial assistance under mild
conditionality led to a mission creep. Guarantors thought that they could control
moral hazard by releasing funds in instalments subject to fiscal reforms by the
Greek government. Instead they had no option but to release all funds in return for
little cooperation from the government just to prevent it from defaulting. Later in
the history of the bond, the conflicts between the guarantors added a layer of moral
hazard, which deteriorated even more the governance of the Greek loans.
4.2 The Turkish 4% loan of 1855
Although the origins of the Ottoman Empire’s attempts to contract a loan in
international markets can be extended back to the 1780s, it issued its first bond
in 1854 in order to finance the Crimean War (Akar and Al, 2003). The underwriter
(Palmer and Goldschmidt) initially demanded that the British government acted
as guarantor, however the British prime minister, Palmerston, was reluctant to
provide financial help in the form of a guaranty.28 The payments of this bond
were secured by part of the Egyptian tribute. The authorized amount for this
issue was £5 million, but the Ottoman government only raised £3 million.
However, by 1853 the war expenditure had reached almost 67% of total
26 HCPP 1864 (144) Greek loan. A bill for authorizing the relinquishment in favour of the King
of the Hellenes of certain money payable in respect of the Greek loan; HCPP 1864 [3346] Papers
relating to the arrangement concluded at Athens in June 1860 respecting the Greek loan.
27 Levandis (1944:28).
28 Anderson (1964:47–51).
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government spending and on the 5 April 1855 the Ottoman government officially
requested the remaining £2 million and asked the British and French govern-
ments to jointly guarantee the issue.
The situation worsened by May due to the collapse of the peace negotiations
in Vienna and with the prospects of more extensive military operations, it was
decided that a bigger sum was needed. A new loan of £5 million was organized
under the joint guaranty of Britain and France. After lengthy discussions in the
House of Commons, on 20 July the financial resolution authorizing the guaranty
was passed by a majority of only three.29 According to the convention signed
between the French, British and the Ottoman governments, the service of this
loan was to be met by the remaining part of the Egyptian tribute together with
the customs income of Izmir and Syria. Moreover, in case of default, the interest
and repayments were guaranteed jointly and severally by Britain and France.30
This joint guaranty enabled the issue of the bond above par and at an
interest rate of 4%. The net interest was 3.9%, almost exactly the average cost
of funding of the guarantors, which in the month prior to the issue averaged just
3 basis points below the effective rate on the Turkish bond. But these favorable
terms came with several conditions. One condition of the guaranty was to use
the proceedings entirely for war purposes. In order to supervise the expenditure,
Lord Hobart and the Marquis de Ploeuc were assigned as British and French
representatives. The role of these commissioners, who were sent to Istanbul
despite the opposition of the Ottoman government, was to verify the treasury
accounts and ensure the funds were spent in support of the army (Kiray, 1988;
Al, 2007). However, due to the diplomatic resistance of the Ottoman Empire, the
work of the commission started only in January 1856, after several army con-
tracts had already been signed in order to evade its control. By September 1856
all funds were spent and the commission finished its work.31
In October 1875, when the Ottoman Empire defaulted on the interest pay-
ments on its outstanding debt of c. £200 million, the Porte also suspended the
prescribed sinking fund of one per cent of the guaranteed loan. Despite this, the
sums due continued to be regularly advanced by the Bank of England to the
bondholders until the settlement of the Turkish default in 1881.32 In fact, part of
29 Anderson (1964:55).
30 HCPP 1968 Declaration exchanged between the British and French governments relative to
the Turkish loan, signed at London, 27 July 1855, and HCPP 1961 Convention between Her
Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and the Sultan, for the guarantee of a loan to be raised by
the Sultan, signed at London, 27 June 1855.
31 Anderson (1964:61) and Badem (2010:326–327).
32 HMT (1916) “Turkey: Ottoman public debt 1854–1914: External Guaranteed Loan 1855:
memoranda by S A Armitage-Smith.”
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the funds were originally Turkish, as the tribute payable by Cyprus to the
Turkish Government had been retained from 1878 by Great Britain and applied
to the service of the loan. This bond was eventually retired in 1943.33
As in the previous bond, the weak conditionality imposed by Turkey’s
creditors led to an eventual default, during which the creditors honored their
guaranty. The link between post-contractual opportunism and default is, of
course, less clear than in the Greek case, since 21 years separate the 1855 loan
from the 1876 default, a period when the Ottoman external debt increased 23
fold (Tuncer, 2015).
4.3 The Egyptian 3% loan of 1885
The Egyptian government contracted its first “state loan” in 1862, and from this
year to 1873 the total amount of loans raised in international financial markets
reached the sum of £E68 millions.34 In 1873, the government issued a large external
loan, amounting to £E32 millions, with the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Bischoffsheim,
Société Générale and other banking houses. This loan was secured by all the
revenues of the railways of Lower Egypt, the proceeds of the personal and indirect
taxes, the salt tax, as well as a share of the receipts from the Moukabala.35 Taken
together with the previous guaranties, this covered almost all the general revenues
of the Egyptian government. Although the loan of 1873 was seen as a success for
the government, the 1876 financial crisis, which led to the bankruptcy of the
Ottoman Empire and several other states, had an immediate effect on Egyptian
credit, and the government suspended the payments on outstanding debt.
A settlement was reached on the same year, whereby an institution named the
“Caisse de la Dette Publique” was established, under the direction of foreign
commissioners nominated by their respective governments; these commissioners
were authorized to receive the revenues intended to service the debt directly from
the local authorities. Taxes from several Egyptian provinces, monopolies and
customs revenues were assigned to the Caisse. Moreover, the debt settlement
established an Anglo-French control over the finances of Egypt. Finally, the agree-
ment called for the unification of the entire debt stock, which at the time stood at
33 Wynne (1951).
34 Crouchley (1938), CFB (1914). The Egyptian pound (£E) had an approximate value of £1.04
sterling.
35 This name originated from the “compensation” introduced by the Egyptian government in
1871, which provided landowners the option of paying six years’ land tax in advance with a
discount. See McCoan (1877).
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£91 million. Apart from its financial consequences, this settlement marked the
beginning of a set of historical events, which in the end led to the military takeover
of Egypt by Britain in 1882. Within a few months of the British taking over, the
Anglo-French control was abolished. The British Consul-General was given overall
authority and English advisers were posted to the Egyptian ministries.36
The first thing that the new British administration faced was a budget deficit
due to the costs of the military campaign. The net revenues from the Daira37 and
the domains were insufficient for the amounts required to service the loans
secured by these properties. In 1884 the government was in need of a new
foreign loan and recognized that it had to expand state revenues to maintain a
minimum level of public works and handle the heavy expenditure on account of
the war in Sudan. According to Edgar Vincent, then financial adviser to the
Egyptian government, “the financial history of the year [1884] may be summed
up in the statement that it consisted in a long struggle to stave off bank-
ruptcy.”38 In fact, from early 1884 the Rothschilds had already started advancing
funds to the Egyptian government in order to prevent a default and the British
government was quite keen that they carried on this arrangement. Rothschilds
requested that the British government guaranteed a new loan to consolidate the
debt, but the government refused on 6 August 1884 by stating that “her majesty
government have no authority to guarantee the repayment of any debt of the
government of Egypt, nor can they determine of present the precise amount of
the influence to be exercised by them with regard to the financial engagement of
that country.” Nevertheless, the foreign secretary Lord Granville reassured that
the government did “not entertain any doubt that the advance of your house
ought to be and will be repaid.”39 As a consequence, the Rothschilds continued
renewing their advances to the Egyptian government until an agreement for a
new loan was reached in July 1885.40
To this effect, the British government invited in April 1884 the representatives
of five other powers (Germany, Austria, Russia, France and the Ottoman Empire)
to a conference in London. After prolonged negotiations regarding the nature of
the guaranty, an agreement was signed by the six powers in March 1885,
36 Cromer (1908), Sayyid-Marsot (2007).
37 Dairas or “administrations” refer to the large estates of the Egyptian Khedive and his family.
See McCoan (1877).
38 FO 1885 “Reports on the State of Egypt and the Progress of Administrative Reforms,” Egypt,
No.15 [C. 4421.], p. 51–52.
39 RA 1884 “Egyptian loan 1884–1885 private correspondence Nathaniel de Rothschild and
Lord Granville and Egyptian Finance Minister” XI/111/16.
40 FO 1885 “Reports on the State of Egypt and the Progress of Administrative Reforms,” Egypt,
No.15 [C. 4421.] p. 51–52, and 85.
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according to which the Egyptian government was authorized to take out a new
loan not exceeding £9 million and at a rate not to exceed 3.5%. This loan was
jointly and severally guaranteed by Germany, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary,
Russia, France and Italy.41 The effective interest rate at launch was a very
moderate 3.1%, which compares favorably with the average cost of funding of
the guaranteeing powers, which in the month prior to the issue of the Egyptian
bond stood at 4.2%.42 Even the average of just the yields of Britain and France
was 3.4% in the same month. Despite the already mentioned concerns about
“convex scenarios,” the loan was floated but 13 basis points above the yield of
British consols.43 The heavy involvement of the British government in preventing
an Egyptian default prior to the agreement to issue the guaranteed loan is a
striking example of the political nature of these operations and probably explains
in part the low yield at issue.
The 1885 convention also introduced a few other adjustments to the finan-
cial position of Egypt. During the negotiations, Britain had advocated a perma-
nent reduction of interest on the old debt while France had opposed any
reduction. As a compromise, the convention provided a temporary tax of 5%
on the coupons of previous loans (Preference and Unified) due in 1885 and in
1886 to supplement the funds available to the Egyptian government.44
From 1885 onwards Egyptian finances started to improve, and by 1890 the
budget yielded a surplus. During the period 1885–1903 the Egyptian government
contracted another four foreign loans with an average effective interest rate of
4%. The final major event of the period was the agreement between Britain and
France in April 1904. On the eve of this agreement, four separate bonds
remained: the Guaranteed Debt created in 1885; the Privileged Debt, bearing
interest (since the conversion of 1890) at 3%; the Unified Debt, bearing interest
at 4% and finally the Daira and Domains Loans. The agreement maintained the
existing structure and only changed the revenues assigned for the service of
these debts.45
41 HCPP [C.4341] Egypt. No. 7 (1885). “Convention between the governments of Great Britain,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, relative to the finances of Egypt.
Signed at London, 18 March 1885.”
42 The bonds used were the 3% British consols (yield of 3%), the 3% French Rentes (3.7%),
the 4% Russian Nicholas Railway (5%), the 4% Prussian consolidated (3.9%), the 4% Austrian
Gold Rentes (4.9%) and the 5% Italian Rendita (4.6%).
43 See the Economist, 21.3.1885, p. 344.
44 Wynne (1951) and RA 1885 “Egyptian Guaranteed Loan Contract – 3% £9,424,000 24/8/85-
23/4/87,” 000/401D/7.
45 Crouchley (1938); Feis (1972); Brunyate (1906).
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4.4 The Chinese 4% (Franco-Russian) loan of 1895
Prior to 1895 the majority of Chinese external bonds were small sums issued by
the provinces and secured by the corresponding receipts of the Chinese Maritime
Customs. A significant part of these external loans were contracted in order to
pay indemnities and to finance war, especially with Japan.
In 1895, following the defeat in another war with Japan, China needed funds
to meet the first installment of the war indemnity of 200 million kuping taels.
According to the Shimonoseki Treaty signed on 17 April, China was required to
pay half of the war indemnity in one year, and the rest in 7 years with 5%
interest.46 After the imposition of the peace treaty, the Chinese government
considered the issuance of a loan, and contemplated the appointment of the
British diplomatic representative in China, Sir Robert Hart, to take charge of the
financial arrangements. However, this proposal was met with strong resistance
from Russia, which was keen on providing a loan to China through a joint
Franco-Russian banking consortium. Consequently, a loan amounting to 400
million francs was issued at 96.5% and carrying an interest of 4%. The effective
interest of 4.15% stood about 27 basis points above the contemporary yields of
Russian bonds. Maturity was 36 years and it was secured by the revenues of the
Maritime Customs of China, with priority over all subsequent loans.47 In the
event that the service of the loan was delayed or suspended, the Imperial
Russian Government guaranteed to pay any amount due. In order to ensure
the timely payment of the loan, the Chinese government also committed not to
use the receipts of the Chinese Maritime Customs for the issue of new loans until
amortization of the 1895 bonds was completed.48 The fact that all issues were
secured by the proceeds of the Maritime Customs raised concerns among the
contemporary investors:
[By] pledging the maritime customs the Chinese government is alienating a source of
revenue upon which it will probably find it very difficult to get on without… The broad
fact is, that the one really good security which China has to offer has already been charged
pretty heavily, and the idea which seems to prevail at present that she may safely be
trusted to almost any extent is utterly fallacious.49
Contrary to what one might expect, the problem with the 1895 guaranteed loan
was not China or the Maritime Customs administration but Russia itself, which
46 FO 1895 Miscellaneous Papers, Vol. 48, p. 160.
47 Viner (1928), Feng-Hua (1919), Kimber (1920).
48 FO 1895 Miscellaneous Papers, Vol. 48, p. 336 and MacMurray (1921).
49 “Chinese Borrowing” The Economist (London, England), Saturday, July 13, 1895; p. 907
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was not in a favorable fiscal condition. Uncharacteristically, the yields of the
Chinese guaranteed bonds performed better than the loans of its guarantor state
Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.
4.5 The Greek 2.5% guaranteed loan of 1898
The settlement of the independence loans in 1879 marked the reappearance of
Greece in the financial markets of Europe, followed by an era of rapid debt
expansion, which eventually culminated in another default in 1893.50
Immediately after the default, in December 1893, the Corporation of Foreign
Bondholders and bondholder representatives of other countries appointed a
committee to start negotiations with the Greek government.51 The formal
negotiations had a slow start because of the Greek demand of an extensive
reduction in the capital and interest of the outstanding debt.
The defeat in the 1897 war with Turkey over Crete added up to the Greek
financial troubles. According to the peace terms, determined through the media-
tion of six powers (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and
Russia), Greece was condemned to pay a war indemnity, which made the
financial position of the country even worse. In accordance with the prelimin-
aries of peace, in 1898 the powers assembled a commission to report on the
financial condition of Greece.
On the basis of this report, Greece agreed to sign the 1898 Law of Control
as demanded by the representatives of the foreign powers and consented to the
creation of an International Financial Commission. Moreover, it agreed to
pledge the gross proceeds of the monopolies (salt, petroleum, matches, play-
ing cards and cigarette paper), tobacco dues, stamp dues and the Piraeus
customs duties to the service of its external debt. The collection of these
revenues was placed in the hands of a company registered in Greece, but
under the effective control of the Commission. In return, the powers agreed
to guarantee a new loan to allow Greece to pay the indemnity. The maximum
amount of the loan was fixed at £6.8 million, but the actual amount issued was
£6,023,700.52 In order to ensure a favorable rate, the three governments agreed
to make their guaranty “joint and several” – instead of only several as they
had done in 1833. As a result, the bonds, bearing 2.5% coupons were marketed
50 Levandis (1944).
51 CFB (1893).
52 HCPP, 1898 [C.8778] Greece. No. 1 (1898). Despatch from Her Majesty’s minister at Athens,
inclosing the Greek law of control.
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at a small premium and oversubscribed. Once more, the combination of
guaranteeing powers of different credit standing did not markedly affect the
effective yield on the guaranteed bonds. The average yields of the three powers
were 2.9% before the floating of the new Greek bond and, in particular, British
consols paid but two basis points below the Greek guaranteed bond. In the
post-1898 period, Greece was able to contract eight more external loans,
totaling £28 million. More than half of this value was used to finance the
Balkan Wars in 1912–1913.
5 Conclusions
This paper has shown that debt mutualization solutions were previously tried in
Europe, though in a smaller scale than those considered today. We revisited the
debate on Eurobonds as a solution to the fiscal crisis in the Eurozone by
providing an overview of the relevant economic and historical literature on
debt mutualization around the issues of debt dilution, moral hazard and con-
ditionality. We then focused the argument on the closest historical parallels to
today’s proposals: the guaranteed bonds issued before World War I, and uncov-
ered a nineteenth-century debate, which shared uncanny similarities with the
current arguments pro and against Eurobonds. As envisaged by today’s propo-
sals, these bonds were seen by the markets as instances of debt mutualization,
but there are also significant differences between the two periods we compare.
As regards to the aims of debt mutualization, we recognize that the
current debate mostly emphasizes economic factors such as restoring financial
stability, improving transmission of monetary policy and the efficiency of the
sovereign debt market. Before 1914 international political and strategic con-
siderations, great power rivalry, and military support played a significant role
in debt mutualization. One could perhaps construct an argument about how
the strengthening of the Euro via issuance of Eurobonds can also be inter-
preted from an international political economy perspective. This, however, is
not always explicitly stated in the current debate and we have not elaborated
on this issue in the paper.
In terms of practical implementation of the debt mutualization via
Eurobonds, the current debate mainly revolves around issues of moral hazard,
debt dilution and conditionality. One conclusion to draw from the historical
discussion is that the fears about short-run dilution and moral hazard were not
unknown to pre-1914 market participants and guaranteed bonds were issued
under severe criticism from market participants. Debt dilution and moral
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hazard concerns were addressed within the governance of the sovereign debt
market before 1914. Solutions ranged from several types of credit enhance-
ments included in bond covenants to international financial control to enforce
debt repayments. Nineteenth century shades of conditionality ranged from
special debt commissions (as in the case of the guaranteed loan of Turkey in
1855) to partial to the transfer of fiscal sovereignty to foreign creditors as in the
Greek guaranteed bond of 1898.
Our analysis of pre-1914 guaranteed bonds also suggests that the dilution
of outstanding obligations may be an overplayed argument, especially con-
sidering the similarities in the scale of debt mutualization between now and
then. Our review of historical literature and evidence demonstrates that mar-
kets treated guaranteed bonds and countries’ own bonds differently.
Elsewhere, we show more formally that the investors priced the guaranteed
bonds on the basis of the credit risk of guarantors. This was not always a good
thing whenever the credit of the guarantor state was in doubt as in the case of
Russian guaranty of the Greek and Chinese bonds (Esteves and Tuncer, 2016).
Here again, the present imitates history, as the reaction of the spreads of the
EFSF bonds to the downgrade of eight of the guaranteeing sovereigns in late
2011 is there to show.
Finally, our review of the nineteenth century guaranteed bonds revealed
how the nature of the guaranty affected the governance of mutualized debt. A
several-only guaranty contributed to creditor moral hazard in the case of the first
Greek loan. Furthermore, non-overlapping constituencies of guarantors and
external creditors also created incentives for creditor moral hazard, this time
illustrated by the second Greek bailout of 1898.
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